Asset Growth and the Cross-Section of Stock Returns
"ONE OF THE PRIMARY FUNCTIONS OF CAPITAL MARKETS is the efficient pricing of real investment. As companies acquire and dispose of assets, economic efficiency demands that the market appropriately capitalizes such transactions. Yet, growing evidence identifies an important bias in the market's capitalization of corporate asset investment and disinvestment. The findings suggest that corporate events associated with asset expansion (i.e., acquisitions, public equity offerings, public debt offerings, and bank loan initiations) tend to be followed by periods of abnormally low returns, whereas events associated with asset contraction (i.e., spinoffs, share repurchases, debt prepayments, and dividend initiations) tend to be followed by periods of abnormally high returns."
A recent Barron's article explained it this way:*
Barron's: Buy the Asset Sellers
"A 2008 study published in the Journal of Finance found that over the long term, U.S. stocks in the market's bottom decile ranked by recent asset growth outperformed those in the top decile by 13 percentage points a year."
The article also points out that...
"A 2012 paper that focused on international markets reported similar findings."
The paper's findings (on page 1610) reveal specifically the following gap in performance from 1968 through 2003:
Value weighted (VW) returns for firms with lowest asset growth: 18%
Value weighted (VW) returns for firms with highest asset growth: 5%
"...we find that raw value-weighted (VW) portfolio annualized returns for firms in the lowest growth decile are on average 18%, while VW returns for firms in the highest growth decile are on average much lower at 5%."
So there is the 13% gap but the paper also notes that "with standard risk adjustments the spread between low and high asset growth firms remains highly significant at 8% per year for VW portfolios and 20% per year for equal weighted (EW) portfolios."
I am highly skeptical of the "standard risk adjustments" but that's a subject for another day. Still, even using the most conservative numbers from this paper, the gap is not at all insignificant.
The paper concludes by calling this "a substantial asset growth effect on firm returns."**
I've mentioned the following quote before but, due to its relevance, I'll include it here for those who may not be familiar with it:
"Growth is always a component in the calculation of value, constituting a variable whose importance can range from negligible to enormous and whose impact can be negative as well as positive." - Warren Buffett in the 1992 Berkshire Hathaway (BRKa) Shareholder Letter
The bottom line is to avoid the misjudgment that exciting growth must necessarily lead to high returns. That growth might be a negative factor may or may not be counterintuitive, but understanding it is very useful and important. On occasion, high growth requires so much capital that returns are poor for owners. Other times, fast growth attracts competitors, fresh capital, and possibly a disruption that changes what, for a time at least, looked like attractive economics. The list goes on. There are many variations of this that tend to be very industry specific.
(Consider how often growth is mentioned on a major business media outlet with at least the implied assumption that growth must be a good thing. Another way to think about it is this: In that context how often -- though, admittedly, a subtlety even if a crucial one -- is the potential negative implications of growth written about or discussed? I think we're talking, at best, about exceptions to the rule.)
In contrast, sometimes -- though it is far from assured -- the boring, stable, firms with only modest or low growth prospects establish themselves in a competitive framework that allows the strongest to maintain attractive return on capital for a very long time. Now, there are, without a doubt, many examples of growth being a very good thing for investors. The problems arise when growth is assumed to always be somewhere between a good and a great thing for investors; they arise when no consideration is given to the alternative implications of growth; they also arise when extreme an premium price is paid -- relative to approximate intrinsic value -- upfront for that potential growth.***
High growth rates and attractive long-term investment outcomes need not have much to do with each other.
The main point is that growth is often treated as always being a good thing. Well, sometimes growth is of the low (or worse) return variety. Think airlines for many decades. That industry grew impressively for quite some time. Sometimes, too much is paid for the privilege of ownership because of the exciting growth prospects.
The study above happens to focus on asset growth and returns.
Well, this "asset growth effect" seems not at all limited to asset growth; it seems to apply to growth more generally (though certainly not a rule of some kind...there are plenty of examples of good growth). Below, I've included some related posts that may be of interest to explore further along these lines.
I happen to think it's not a bad habit to consider carefully things that conflict, contradict, or that might be inconsistent with what one is predisposed to think (or with prevailing wisdom). It's all too easy to quickly dismiss what's counterintuitive and just move onto the next thing. Some will run into an odd paradox, for example, and treat it as nothing more than an interesting anomaly. Too often -- or, at least, often enough -- that is a mistake. The biggest insights -- though, of course, not all -- can reside near what at first seems nonsensical. Occasionally, the most useful discoveries are found inside or near what initially seems unfamiliar, contradictory, and even uncomfortable.
Another mistake is to "write off" 100% of an investment idea due to some very real existing flaw. Well, sometimes the part that is right can be very useful (i.e. lucrative) while the downside (or cost) of what's wrong is very small. In the real world, more often than not, solutions are usually going to at least somewhat messy and incomplete. Investment is always the weighing of various pros and cons. It's making smart trade-offs between alternatives. It's about opportunity costs.
When something doesn't sit well with what is preconceived, it's just generally not a good idea to ignore it. In fact, to me it's better to develop a tendency to do the exact opposite. Admittedly, this frequently leads nowhere but, at least, new things are learned. In fact, I'd argue it's best to study and try to learn from those kinds of things at least 2 or 3 times as hard as one might otherwise be inclined to do.
I've not yet found the perfect investment and, well, I won't.
Yet plenty of good but flawed ones exist.
Attractive return on capital that's sustainable long-term and purchased at the right price (i.e. plain discount to value) is a priority.
Growth, in a vacuum, isn't.
Sometimes growth leads to the creation of enduring value for shareholders, but too often it leads to the exact opposite outcome:
Reduced rewards for the investor at greater risk of permanent capital loss.
Long position in BRKb established at much lower than recent market prices
Buffett and Munger on See's Candy: Part II - June 2013
Buffett and Munger on See's Candy - June 2013
Aesop's Investment Axiom - February 2013
Grantham: Investing in a Low-Growth World - February 2013
Buffett: Stocks, Bonds, and Coupons - January 2013
Maximizing Per-Share Value - October 2012
Death of Equities Greatly Exaggerated - August 2012
Stock Returns & GDP Growth - July 2012
Why Growth Matters Less Than Investors Think - July 2012
Ben Graham: Better Than Average Expected Growth - March 2012
Buffett: Why Growth Is Not Necessarily A Good Thing - Oct 2011
Buffett: What See's Taught Us - May 2011
Buffett on Coca-Cola, See's & Railroads - May 2011
Buffett on Pricing Power - February 2011
Grantham: High Growth Doesn't Equal High Returns - Nov 2010
Growth & Investor Returns - June 2010
High Growth Doesn't Equal High Investor Returns - July 2009
The Growth Myth Revisited - July 2009
Pricing Power - July 2009
The Growth Myth - June 2009
Buffett on Economic Goodwill - April 2009
* The title of this article alone pretty much says it all:
Fast firm growth doesn't mean great stock returns
"It may surprise most investors that firms experiencing rapid growth subsequently have low stock returns, whereas contracting firms enjoy high future returns. For example, a 2008 study found that a value-weighted portfolio of U.S. stocks in the top asset-growth decile underperformed the portfolio of stocks in the bottom decile by 13 percent per year for the period 1968-2003. A recent paper shows that the same is true internationally as well."
** From the conclusion: "Over our sample period firms with the low asset growth rates earn subsequent annualized risk-adjusted returns of 9.1% on average while firms with highest asset growth rates earn - 10.4%. The large 19.5% spread is highly significant. Weighting the firms by capitalization reduces the spread to a still large and significant 8.4% per year." The 13% gap noted above is value weighted (VW) but not adjusted for risk. Take your pick. These all represent rather significant gaps in performance.
*** On the surface, estimating intrinsic business value on a per share basis isn't necessarily difficult. As Buffett has said: "Intrinsic value can be defined simply: It is the discounted value of the cash that can be taken out of a business during its remaining life." So just figure out what cash can be taken out of a business over the long haul then discount that cash appropriately, right? Not so fast. The definition is simple. The calculation itself is not. It's, in part, the assumptions (interest rates, future cash flows, how well future cash will be put to work, etc.), some of it hard to quantify but important stuff, that make the actual calculation more difficult and, inevitably, at best a range of possible values (even if the mechanics aren't that tough to learn). Buffett has also said there are good reasons "we never give you our estimates of intrinsic value." (The one explicit reason Buffett mentions being that not even Charlie Munger and himself will come up with the same intrinsic value estimate using the same facts.) Instead, he prefers to provide "the facts that we ourselves use to calculate this value." In the 2011 letter, Buffett explained that while they "have no way to pinpoint intrinsic value," a useful -- even if "considerably understated" -- proxy happens to be book value. This older post on how Buffett likes to specifically discount cash in order to calculate value might be of interest to some.
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